Security Questionnaire Mapper

Vulnerability and patch management: the clause the question tests

How weaknesses are found and how fast they are fixed, by severity.

How the customer usually asks it

example

"How quickly are critical security patches applied to production systems?"

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Anchor clauses

7 frameworks
FrameworkAnchor clause
ISO/IEC 27001:20228.8 Management of technical vulnerabilities
SOC 2 (Trust Services Criteria)CC7.1 CC7.1 Detecting configuration changes and new vulnerabilities
SIG (Shared Assessments)domain P Threat Management
CSA Cloud Controls Matrix v4.0.1TVM-03 Vulnerability Remediation Schedule
NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0ID.RA-01 Vulnerabilities in assets are identified, validated, and recorded
NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5RA-5 Vulnerability monitoring and scanning
PCI DSS v4.0.16.3.3 Timely installation of security patches · 11.3.1 Quarterly internal vulnerability scans

Every framework that anchors this family is listed here; a register shows the ones ticked for the customer.

Evidence expected

The vulnerability management procedure with remediation windows by severity, the latest scan summary, and patch compliance figures for production.

The clauses, with what an assessor asks for

ISO 27001 8.8 Management of technical vulnerabilities

Obtain vulnerability information, evaluate exposure, and take appropriate remediation.

Evidence an assessor expects: Vulnerability feed logs; Risk assessment reports; Remediation ticket records; Patch deployment evidence
Where answers usually fall short: Relying on ad-hoc scans only; Missing documented risk ranking for vulnerabilities
Source: ISO/IEC 27001:2022
SOC 2 CC7.1 CC7.1 Detecting configuration changes and new vulnerabilities

Named only: the criteria are not stated here; see the official text.

Evidence an assessor expects: Hardening standards or benchmarks for in-scope platforms; Configuration compliance scan results; Vulnerability scan reports and remediation tickets with timelines; Asset discovery showing detection of unauthorised devices
Where answers usually fall short: Critical vulnerabilities open beyond the remediation target; Scans exclude parts of the production environment
Source: SOC 2 (Trust Services Criteria)
SIG domain P Threat Management

What it asks for, in one line (the standard's own text is not quoted here):

Maintain threat intelligence, vulnerability management, penetration testing, and red team capabilities to identify and remediate weaknesses in a timely manner.

Evidence an assessor expects: Threat intelligence sources and feeds; Vulnerability scan reports with remediation timelines; Annual external penetration test report; Red team or purple team exercise reports
Where answers usually fall short: Critical vulnerabilities open beyond SLA; Penetration test scope omits new applications
Source: SIG (Shared Assessments)
CSA CCM TVM-03 Vulnerability Remediation Schedule

What it asks for, in one line (the standard's own text is not quoted here):

Have defined routes for both scheduled and emergency response to a discovered vulnerability, chosen according to the risk that vulnerability carries.

Evidence an assessor expects: The documented scheduled and emergency response paths with their trigger criteria; Records of emergency responses invoked and the outcome; The risk criteria that select between the two paths; Evaluation evidence that the paths work under pressure
Where answers usually fall short: Emergency path undefined, so urgent vulnerabilities queue behind routine work; Trigger criteria absent, making the choice of path arbitrary
Source: CSA Cloud Controls Matrix v4.0.1
NIST CSF ID.RA-01 Vulnerabilities in assets are identified, validated, and recorded

Vulnerabilities in assets are identified, validated, and recorded.

Evidence an assessor expects: Vulnerability scanning coverage report; Vulnerability triage workflow with severity SLAs; Validated findings with proof and remediation status; Asset coverage exceptions register; Trend analysis on vulnerability backlog
Where answers usually fall short: Coverage gaps for cloud and container workloads; SLAs missed for high severity items
Source: NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0
SP 800-53 RA-5 Vulnerability monitoring and scanning

Requires vulnerability monitoring and scanning of the system and hosted applications at a defined frequency or randomly by a defined process and when new relevant vulnerabilities are reported, using tools and techniques that support standardised enumeration, checklists and impact measurement, with results analysed, remediation within defined response times by risk, results shared with defined personnel, and privileged scanning access where required.

Evidence an assessor expects: Scan schedule and coverage evidence across the system and hosted applications; Scan reports with findings ranked by severity; Defined remediation timeframes by risk level and evidence they are met; Records of scan result distribution to the defined personnel; Configuration showing authenticated or privileged scanning where required
Where answers usually fall short: Unauthenticated scanning only, which understates the real vulnerability position; Remediation timeframes defined but routinely exceeded with no risk acceptance
Source: NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5
PCI DSS 6.3.3 Timely installation of security patches

What it asks for, in one line (the standard's own text is not quoted here):

All system components must be shielded from known vulnerabilities by applying relevant security patches or updates such that: patches or updates addressing critical vulnerabilities, as ranked under Requirement 6.3.1, must go in within one month of their release; and every other relevant security patch or update is installed within a suitable time frame set by the entity's own assessment of how critical the risk is to its environment, using the Requirement 6.3.1 ranking process. It applies to all entities and all system components. Customized approach objective: exploitation of a known vulnerability cannot be used to compromise system components.

Evidence an assessor expects: Patch management procedure stating the one-month deadline for critical patches and time frames for others; Patch compliance reports per system component showing install dates against vendor release dates; Risk-based rationale or targeted risk analysis for non-critical patch time frames; Exception register for patches that could not be applied, with compensating measures; Sample of critical advisories traced to installation evidence
Where answers usually fall short: Critical patches applied more than one month after release because of change freeze windows; Network devices, hypervisors or appliances excluded from patch reporting
Source: PCI DSS v4.0.1
PCI DSS 11.3.1 Quarterly internal vulnerability scans

What it asks for, in one line (the standard's own text is not quoted here):

Internal vulnerability scans must be run at least every three months. All vulnerabilities ranked high-risk or critical under the entity's risk rankings from Requirement 6.3.1 must be resolved, and rescans must be run to confirm that every such high-risk and critical finding is fixed. The scanning tool must be kept current with the latest vulnerability information, and the people running scans must be qualified and organizationally independent of what they scan. Guidance (good practice): several scan reports may be combined to show full coverage within the three-month cycle, and scanning more often than quarterly is recommended where the environment warrants it. Applicability: a QSA or ASV is not needed for internal scans; qualified internal staff reasonably independent of the scanned components (for example, not the administrator of that network) may run them, or a specialist scanning firm may be used. Objective under the customized approach: automated tools that detect vulnerabilities inside the network periodically verify the security state of every system component, and findings are assessed and fixed using a formal risk assessment framework.

Evidence an assessor expects: Four quarters of internal scan reports covering all in-scope system components; Rescan reports showing high-risk and critical findings closed; Scan tool plugin or signature update logs; Vulnerability risk ranking criteria from Requirement 6.3.1; Scanner qualifications and evidence of independence from the scanned systems
Where answers usually fall short: A quarter missed or the scan scope omitted some CDE segments; High or critical findings remain open with no rescan evidence
Source: PCI DSS v4.0.1

Other families in operations, logging and vulnerability