Security Questionnaire Mapper
Clause text

PCI DSS v4.0.1: the clauses the register cites

The 12 PCI DSS v4.0.1 clauses that questions are placed on, each with the evidence an assessor asks for and where answers usually fall short.

The text of this standard is not stated here, so it is not quoted: each requirement carries a one-line statement of what it asks for, with its code and title, and the standard itself holds the wording.

12 clauses

the families they anchor
PCI DSS 3.2.1 Data retention and disposal minimise stored account data

What it asks for, in one line (the standard's own text is not quoted here):

The entity limits stored account data through policies, procedures and processes governing how long data is kept and how it is disposed of, which address at minimum: (1) every location where account data is stored; (2) any sensitive authentication data (SAD) held before authorization completes; (3) restricting the volume held and the retention period to what legal, regulatory and/or business needs demand; (4) defined retention periods for stored account data, each with a documented business justification; (5) processes to securely delete account data, or make it unrecoverable, once the retention policy says it is no longer needed; and (6) a check performed at least every three months confirming that account data held beyond its retention period has been made unrecoverable or deleted securely. Applicability: where the data is stored by a third-party service provider such as a cloud provider, the entity is responsible for working with it to understand how the provider satisfies this requirement, with considerations including secure deletion of every geographic instance of a data element. Objective under the customized approach: account data is kept only where needed, for the shortest necessary time, and is securely removed or made unrecoverable afterwards. Future-dated (bullet covering SAD stored before authorization completes): treated as a best practice up to 31 March 2025 and mandatory since then.

Evidence an assessor expects: Data retention and disposal policy with retention periods and business justification per data type; Inventory or data-flow map of all account data storage locations, including backups, archives, removable media, paper and call recordings; Quarterly purge verification records (at least every three months) with results and sign-off; Secure deletion tool configuration or output (for example NIST SP 800-88 aligned wiping) and sample evidence of unrecoverable data; Pre-authorization SAD handling and retention records
Where answers usually fall short: Retention policy omits backups, log files or call-recording platforms where PAN also lands; Quarterly check is not performed or has gaps longer than three months
Source: PCI DSS v4.0.1
PCI DSS 3.5.1 Stored PAN rendered unreadable

What it asks for, in one line (the standard's own text is not quoted here):

PAN must be made unreadable wherever it is stored, using one of these methods: (1) one-way hashes of the whole PAN based on strong cryptography; (2) truncation, where hashing may not substitute for the removed segment, and where hashed and truncated forms, or differing truncation formats, of the same PAN coexist in an environment, added controls must stop them being correlated to rebuild the original; (3) index tokens; (4) strong cryptography with supporting key-management processes and procedures. Applicability: covers PAN in primary storage (databases, flat files such as text files or spreadsheets) and non-primary storage (backups, audit, exception or troubleshooting logs); temporary files holding cleartext PAN during encryption and decryption are not prohibited. Customized approach objective: PAN held on any storage media is never readable in the clear.

Evidence an assessor expects: Data storage inventory mapping each PAN location to its protection method; Encryption, hashing, truncation or tokenization design documentation including algorithms; Sample database and log extracts showing PAN unreadable; Backup and archive encryption evidence; Controls preventing correlation of hashed and truncated values (for example keyed hashing, segregation)
Where answers usually fall short: Application or troubleshooting logs contain cleartext PAN while the database is encrypted; Hashed and truncated values held together with nothing preventing reconstruction
Source: PCI DSS v4.0.1
PCI DSS 4.2.1 Strong cryptography safeguards PAN over public networks

What it asks for, in one line (the standard's own text is not quoted here):

Wherever PAN crosses open, public networks (such as the Internet, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, cellular and satellite links), PAN must be protected with strong cryptography and security protocols, arranged so that: only keys and certificates that are trusted are accepted; certificates guarding PAN in transit are confirmed as valid and neither revoked nor expired; the protocol permits only secure versions or configurations and cannot use or fall back to any insecure version, algorithm, key size or implementation; and encryption strength suits the encryption method chosen. Protection may be at the data level, the session level, or both. Applicability: a self-signed certificate can be acceptable when an internal CA of the organisation issued it, its author is confirmed, it is verified (for instance by hash or signature) and it has not expired. The bullet on confirming certificates are valid and neither revoked nor expired was advisory only up to 31 March 2025; the remaining bullets were already mandatory. Objective under the customized approach: nobody can read or capture cleartext PAN from traffic over open, public networks. Future-dated: treated as a best practice up to 31 March 2025 and mandatory since then.

Evidence an assessor expects: Data-flow diagram marking every point where PAN enters or leaves over open, public networks; TLS configuration exports or scan results showing allowed protocol versions and cipher suites, with no downgrade path; Certificate validation settings (CRL or OCSP checking, pinning) for servers and client integrations; Packet capture or transmission sample showing PAN is encrypted end to end; Test result showing a connection with an untrusted or expired certificate is refused
Where answers usually fall short: Legacy endpoint or API still negotiates an early TLS version or weak cipher when the client requests it; Integration client code disables certificate verification, accepting any certificate
Source: PCI DSS v4.0.1
PCI DSS 6.3.3 Timely installation of security patches

What it asks for, in one line (the standard's own text is not quoted here):

All system components must be shielded from known vulnerabilities by applying relevant security patches or updates such that: patches or updates addressing critical vulnerabilities, as ranked under Requirement 6.3.1, must go in within one month of their release; and every other relevant security patch or update is installed within a suitable time frame set by the entity's own assessment of how critical the risk is to its environment, using the Requirement 6.3.1 ranking process. It applies to all entities and all system components. Customized approach objective: exploitation of a known vulnerability cannot be used to compromise system components.

Evidence an assessor expects: Patch management procedure stating the one-month deadline for critical patches and time frames for others; Patch compliance reports per system component showing install dates against vendor release dates; Risk-based rationale or targeted risk analysis for non-critical patch time frames; Exception register for patches that could not be applied, with compensating measures; Sample of critical advisories traced to installation evidence
Where answers usually fall short: Critical patches applied more than one month after release because of change freeze windows; Network devices, hypervisors or appliances excluded from patch reporting
Source: PCI DSS v4.0.1
PCI DSS 7.2.4 User accounts and privileges reviewed every six months

What it asks for, in one line (the standard's own text is not quoted here):

All user accounts and their related access privileges, including third-party and vendor accounts, must be reviewed at least every six months. The review must confirm that accounts and access remain appropriate for each person's job function, any inappropriate access must be dealt with, and management must acknowledge that the remaining access is appropriate. The guidance notes the review is also a chance to catch terminated users and third parties whose access was missed. Applicability: covers every user account and related privilege, including accounts of personnel, of vendors and of other third parties and accounts used to reach third-party cloud services; application and system accounts are handled instead by Requirement 7.2.5 (and its sub-requirement) and by 8.6.1 to 8.6.3. Objective under the customized approach: management periodically verifies that account privilege assignments are correct and remediates nonconformities. Future-dated: treated as a best practice up to 31 March 2025 and mandatory since then.

Evidence an assessor expects: Semi-annual user access review records for each in-scope system, with review dates; Evidence that inappropriate access found was removed or corrected, such as closed tickets; Management sign-off acknowledging access remains appropriate; Inventory of third-party, vendor and cloud-service accounts included in the review scope
Where answers usually fall short: Reviews cover employees but omit vendor accounts and cloud console users; Reviewers rubber-stamp lists without evidence of removals being actioned
Source: PCI DSS v4.0.1
PCI DSS 8.4.2 MFA for all non-console CDE access

What it asks for, in one line (the standard's own text is not quoted here):

Every form of non-console access into the CDE, not only administrative access, must be protected with MFA. Applicability: excludes system or application accounts that run automated functions, to point-of-sale terminal user accounts that are limited to a single card number per transaction, or to user accounts authenticated only with phishing-resistant factors. MFA is required separately for this access and for remote access under 8.4.3, so a user who connects remotely to the network and then into the CDE authenticates with MFA twice. It covers every kind of system component (cloud and hosted systems, on-premises applications, workstations, servers, endpoints and network security devices) and both direct network or system access and web-based access to applications. MFA may be applied at network or system/application level, not necessarily both. Objective under the customized approach: access into the CDE cannot be gained with a single authentication factor. Future-dated: treated as a best practice up to 31 March 2025 and mandatory since then.

Evidence an assessor expects: Inventory of all non-console entry paths into the CDE, including web applications, with the MFA point for each; MFA or SSO conditional access policies scoped to CDE resources; Observation records of non-administrative users authenticating into the CDE; List of accounts exempted as automated or phishing-resistant, with justification
Where answers usually fall short: Non-admin users of CDE web applications authenticate with password only; Users on the internal network reach the CDE without a second MFA prompt after remote login
Source: PCI DSS v4.0.1
PCI DSS 10.4.1 Daily review of security-relevant logs

What it asks for, in one line (the standard's own text is not quoted here):

Every day, at a minimum, the entity must review: all security events; the logs of each critical system component; the logs of each system component that stores, processes or transmits CHD and/or SAD; and the logs of each server and system component with a security function (such as authentication servers, IDS/IPS and network security controls). Applies to all entities. Objective under the customized approach: activity that may be suspicious or anomalous is found fast, keeping its impact low.

Evidence an assessor expects: Daily log review procedure naming the four log categories; SIEM dashboards or review tickets showing a review for every calendar day, including weekends and holidays; List of critical system components and security function systems covered by review; Reports or sign-offs from an outsourced SOC, if used; Interview records with analysts performing the review
Where answers usually fall short: No review evidence for weekends or public holidays; Security function devices such as authentication servers not included in the review scope
Source: PCI DSS v4.0.1
PCI DSS 11.3.1 Quarterly internal vulnerability scans

What it asks for, in one line (the standard's own text is not quoted here):

Internal vulnerability scans must be run at least every three months. All vulnerabilities ranked high-risk or critical under the entity's risk rankings from Requirement 6.3.1 must be resolved, and rescans must be run to confirm that every such high-risk and critical finding is fixed. The scanning tool must be kept current with the latest vulnerability information, and the people running scans must be qualified and organizationally independent of what they scan. Guidance (good practice): several scan reports may be combined to show full coverage within the three-month cycle, and scanning more often than quarterly is recommended where the environment warrants it. Applicability: a QSA or ASV is not needed for internal scans; qualified internal staff reasonably independent of the scanned components (for example, not the administrator of that network) may run them, or a specialist scanning firm may be used. Objective under the customized approach: automated tools that detect vulnerabilities inside the network periodically verify the security state of every system component, and findings are assessed and fixed using a formal risk assessment framework.

Evidence an assessor expects: Four quarters of internal scan reports covering all in-scope system components; Rescan reports showing high-risk and critical findings closed; Scan tool plugin or signature update logs; Vulnerability risk ranking criteria from Requirement 6.3.1; Scanner qualifications and evidence of independence from the scanned systems
Where answers usually fall short: A quarter missed or the scan scope omitted some CDE segments; High or critical findings remain open with no rescan evidence
Source: PCI DSS v4.0.1
PCI DSS 11.4.3 External penetration testing annually and after change

What it asks for, in one line (the standard's own text is not quoted here):

External penetration testing must be performed: using the methodology the entity has defined; no less than annually; after every significant upgrade or change to infrastructure or applications; by a qualified tester, whether an internal resource or an external third party; and with organizational independence of the tester (a QSA or ASV is not required). Guidance (good practice): when selecting a tester, entities can weigh specialist penetration testing certifications and prior experience such as years in the field and the type and scope of past engagements. Objective under the customized approach: technical testing following the defined methodology verifies external defenses as often as needed to keep pace with new and evolving attacks and to confirm that significant changes bring in no unknown vulnerabilities.

Evidence an assessor expects: Latest external penetration test report, scope and engagement letter; Tests triggered by significant changes to internet-facing infrastructure or applications; Tester qualifications (certifications, experience summary); Independence confirmation for the tester; External asset inventory used to define scope
Where answers usually fall short: External test scoped to a handful of IPs, missing web applications; New internet-facing application launched without a test
Source: PCI DSS v4.0.1
PCI DSS 12.5.2 Annual and change-driven scope confirmation

What it asks for, in one line (the standard's own text is not quoted here):

The entity must document its PCI DSS scope and confirm it at least once every 12 months, plus whenever the in-scope environment changes significantly. The scoping validation must at minimum: identify all data flows across payment stages (for instance authorisation, capture, settlement, chargebacks, refunds) and every acceptance channel (for instance card-present, card-not-present, e-commerce); update all data-flow diagrams under Requirement 1.2.4; identify every place where account data is held, processed or sent, including places outside the current CDE, applications handling CHD, data transmitted across networks and systems, and backups of files; identify all components in, connected to, or able to affect the CDE; identify all segmentation controls and the environments segmented from the CDE, with justification for out-of-scope environments; identify all third-party connections with CDE access; and confirm all these items are included in scope. Applicability: this is the entity's own confirmation and is separate from, and not replaced by, the assessor's scoping check during the annual assessment. Objective under the customized approach: scope is checked periodically and after significant change through thorough analysis and suitable technical measures.

Evidence an assessor expects: Annual scope confirmation report with date and approver; Updated data-flow diagrams by payment stage and channel; Account data location register including backups and out-of-CDE findings; Segmentation control list with out-of-scope justifications; Third-party connection inventory
Where answers usually fall short: No scope reconfirmation after a significant change such as a new payment channel; Backups or chargeback and refund flows omitted from data mapping
Source: PCI DSS v4.0.1
PCI DSS 12.8.1 List of third-party service providers

What it asks for, in one line (the standard's own text is not quoted here):

The entity must keep a list of every TPSP that receives account data from it or that could influence how safe that data is, and must describe the services each one provides. Applicability: using a PCI DSS compliant TPSP neither makes the entity compliant nor removes its own responsibility for compliance. Customized approach objective: records of TPSPs and the services they supply are kept.

Evidence an assessor expects: TPSP inventory with service descriptions; Procedure for maintaining the TPSP list; Procurement or contract register reconciled to the list; Records of additions and removals
Where answers usually fall short: Cloud, SaaS or remote-support vendors omitted; List lacks a description of services
Source: PCI DSS v4.0.1
PCI DSS 12.10.1 Incident response plan ready for activation

What it asks for, in one line (the standard's own text is not quoted here):

An incident response plan must exist and be ready to activate if a security incident is suspected or confirmed. At minimum it covers: roles and duties, plus approaches for communication and for contacting parties, including at least notifying payment brands and acquirers; response procedures giving specific containment and mitigation steps per incident type; procedures for business recovery and continuity; processes for backing up data; an analysis of the legal duties to report compromises; coverage of, and responses covering, every critical system component; and reference to, or inclusion of, the payment brands' incident response procedures. Objective under the customized approach: a thorough incident response plan meeting card brand expectations is kept.

Evidence an assessor expects: Incident response plan with role and contact tables; Payment brand and acquirer notification procedures; Incident-type playbooks with containment and mitigation steps; Legal reporting requirements analysis; Records of prior incidents showing plan use
Where answers usually fall short: Plan lacks payment brand and acquirer notification steps; Contact details out of date
Source: PCI DSS v4.0.1