Security Questionnaire Mapper
Clause text

SOC 2 (Trust Services Criteria): the clauses the register cites

The 12 SOC 2 (Trust Services Criteria) clauses that questions are placed on, each with the evidence an assessor asks for and where answers usually fall short.

The criteria are not stated here, so they are not quoted: each criterion is named by its code and title, with the evidence an assessor usually asks for.

12 clauses

the families they anchor
SOC 2 A1.2 A1.2 Environmental protection, backup and recovery infrastructure

Named only: the criteria are not stated here; see the official text.

Evidence an assessor expects: Backup policy defining scope, frequency and retention; Backup job monitoring and failure remediation records; Evidence of geographically separate or immutable backup copies; Data centre or cloud provider environmental controls (via their SOC report); Failover architecture documentation
Where answers usually fall short: Backup failures not investigated; Backups reachable and deletable with the same credentials as production
Source: SOC 2 (Trust Services Criteria)
SOC 2 A1.3 A1.3 Testing recovery plan procedures

Named only: the criteria are not stated here; see the official text.

Evidence an assessor expects: Disaster recovery or continuity test plan and results in the period; Backup restore test records with verification of completeness; Plan updates made after test findings; Test scenarios covering failure of a critical vendor
Where answers usually fall short: No recovery test performed in the period; Restore tests confirm a file exists but not that data is complete
Source: SOC 2 (Trust Services Criteria)
SOC 2 CC3.2 CC3.2 Identifying and analysing risks to objectives (COSO principle 7)

Named only: the criteria are not stated here; see the official text.

Evidence an assessor expects: Risk assessment performed in the period with methodology, scoring and approvals; Risk register listing assets with criticality ratings, threats, vulnerabilities, likelihood, impact and treatment; Residual risk ratings and records of risk acceptance by an authorised owner; Vendor and third-party risk inputs to the assessment; Mitigation plans linked to each significant risk
Where answers usually fall short: Risk assessment not refreshed within the last year; Register lists generic risks with no link to assets or vulnerabilities
Source: SOC 2 (Trust Services Criteria)
SOC 2 CC4.1 CC4.1 Ongoing and separate evaluations of control (COSO principle 16)

Named only: the criteria are not stated here; see the official text.

Evidence an assessor expects: Internal audit plan and reports covering security controls; Penetration test and vulnerability scan reports within the period; Management self-assessments or control monitoring dashboards (first and second line); Independent certification reports such as ISO/IEC 27001; Resilience or compliance assessment reports and remediation tracking
Where answers usually fall short: No independent evaluation of controls in the period; Penetration test older than twelve months or scoped too narrowly
Source: SOC 2 (Trust Services Criteria)
SOC 2 CC5.3 CC5.3 Deploying controls through policies and procedures (COSO principle 12)

Named only: the criteria are not stated here; see the official text.

Evidence an assessor expects: Approved information security policy set with owners and review dates; Evidence of annual policy review and approval; Operating procedures for key controls; Records showing exceptions found during control operation were followed up
Where answers usually fall short: Policies past their review date; Procedures describe controls nobody performs
Source: SOC 2 (Trust Services Criteria)
SOC 2 CC6.1 CC6.1 Logical access security over protected information assets

Named only: the criteria are not stated here; see the official text.

Evidence an assessor expects: Asset inventory with classification for in-scope systems; Identity provider configuration showing MFA and password policy; Network diagrams showing segmentation or zero trust access policies for production; Encryption-at-rest configuration, approved algorithms and key lengths, and key management procedure; Inventory of service and system accounts with owners
Where answers usually fall short: Service accounts and API keys outside the access management process; Production network flat with no segmentation
Source: SOC 2 (Trust Services Criteria)
SOC 2 CC6.2 CC6.2 Registering and authorising users before issuing credentials

Named only: the criteria are not stated here; see the official text.

Evidence an assessor expects: Access request tickets with owner approval for a sample of new users, service accounts and API credentials; Termination records reconciled to account disablement dates; Periodic credential validity review sign-offs covering human, system and service accounts, with remediation of findings; Revocation records for keys, tokens and certificates no longer valid
Where answers usually fall short: Accounts created without a recorded approval; Leavers retaining active accounts days or weeks after departure
Source: SOC 2 (Trust Services Criteria)
SOC 2 CC7.1 CC7.1 Detecting configuration changes and new vulnerabilities

Named only: the criteria are not stated here; see the official text.

Evidence an assessor expects: Hardening standards or benchmarks for in-scope platforms; Configuration compliance scan results; Vulnerability scan reports and remediation tickets with timelines; Asset discovery showing detection of unauthorised devices
Where answers usually fall short: Critical vulnerabilities open beyond the remediation target; Scans exclude parts of the production environment
Source: SOC 2 (Trust Services Criteria)
SOC 2 CC7.2 CC7.2 Monitoring system components for anomalies

Named only: the criteria are not stated here; see the official text.

Evidence an assessor expects: Logging standard and SIEM or log platform coverage of in-scope systems; Alert rules and sample of triaged alerts; Threat intelligence sources in use; Evidence detection tools are health-checked (for example log source outage alerts)
Where answers usually fall short: Key systems not sending logs to the monitoring platform; Alerts with no triage record
Source: SOC 2 (Trust Services Criteria)
SOC 2 CC7.4 CC7.4 Responding to security incidents

Named only: the criteria are not stated here; see the official text.

Evidence an assessor expects: Incident response plan with roles and contact lists; Incident tickets showing containment, eradication, recovery and communication; Tabletop exercise or incident simulation records; Post-incident reviews and trend analysis; Privacy breach response procedure and records of its use for confirmed privacy incidents (privacy engagements)
Where answers usually fall short: Incident response plan untested in the period; No record of customer or regulator notification decisions
Source: SOC 2 (Trust Services Criteria)
SOC 2 CC8.1 CC8.1 Managing changes to procedures, software, data and infrastructure

Named only: the criteria are not stated here; see the official text.

Evidence an assessor expects: Change management policy covering normal, standard and emergency changes; Sample of change tickets with approval, testing evidence and deployer different from author; Patch management records with timelines; Evidence production data is not used in test environments, or is masked; Privacy-by-design or data minimisation review records for new features (privacy engagements)
Where answers usually fall short: Changes deployed without recorded approval or testing; Emergency changes never reviewed after the fact
Source: SOC 2 (Trust Services Criteria)
SOC 2 CC9.2 CC9.2 Assessing and managing vendor and business partner risk

Named only: the criteria are not stated here; see the official text.

Evidence an assessor expects: Vendor inventory with risk tiers and the review frequency set for each tier; Due diligence records, for example vendor SOC reports reviewed with complementary controls noted; Contracts with security, confidentiality and privacy clauses; Periodic vendor performance and risk reviews, and offboarding records; Register of third-party access paths and network connections into the organisation's systems
Where answers usually fall short: Critical vendors with no annual review; Vendor SOC reports collected but complementary user entity controls never assessed
Source: SOC 2 (Trust Services Criteria)