Security Questionnaire Mapper
Data protection and encryption ยท question family

Encryption in transit: the clause the question tests

Whether data is protected on the wire, on which paths and with which protocol versions.

How the customer usually asks it

example

"Is all data encrypted in transit using TLS 1.2 or higher?"

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Anchor clauses

5 frameworks
FrameworkAnchor clause
ISO/IEC 27001:20228.24 Use of cryptography
CSA Cloud Controls Matrix v4.0.1CEK-03 Data Encryption
NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0PR.DS-02 The confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data-in-transit are protected
PCI DSS v4.0.14.2.1 Strong cryptography safeguards PAN over public networks
HIPAA Security Rule (45 CFR 164)164.312(e)(1) Transmission Security (Standard)

Every framework that anchors this family is listed here; a register shows the ones ticked for the customer.

Evidence expected

The protocol versions and cipher settings in use on every external and internal path that carries the customer's data, and the certificate management record.

The clauses, with what an assessor asks for

ISO 27001 8.24 Use of cryptography

Define and implement rules for effective use of cryptography and key management.

Evidence an assessor expects: Encryption policy; Key management procedures; Algorithm inventory; Key usage records
Where answers usually fall short: Missing documented key lifecycle; Use of outdated or weak algorithms
Source: ISO/IEC 27001:2022
CSA CCM CEK-03 Data Encryption

What it asks for, in one line (the standard's own text is not quoted here):

Apply cryptographic protection to stored data and to data moving across networks, using libraries that hold certification against an approved standard.

Evidence an assessor expects: Configuration evidence showing encryption enabled at rest and in transit per system; The certification of the cryptographic libraries or modules in use, such as a validation certificate; Inventory of data stores and transport paths with their encryption status; Exceptions where encryption is not applied and the risk acceptance behind them
Where answers usually fall short: Encryption at rest claimed from a provider default without verification per data store; Uncertified or self-built cryptographic implementations in use
Source: CSA Cloud Controls Matrix v4.0.1
NIST CSF PR.DS-02 The confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data-in-transit are protected

The confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data-in-transit are protected.

Evidence an assessor expects: TLS configuration standards and scan results; VPN and zero trust network access policy; Email transport encryption configuration; API security policy with mutual authentication; Network traffic encryption audit
Where answers usually fall short: Weak ciphers still permitted for legacy clients; Internal traffic unencrypted
Source: NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0
PCI DSS 4.2.1 Strong cryptography safeguards PAN over public networks

What it asks for, in one line (the standard's own text is not quoted here):

Wherever PAN crosses open, public networks (such as the Internet, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, cellular and satellite links), PAN must be protected with strong cryptography and security protocols, arranged so that: only keys and certificates that are trusted are accepted; certificates guarding PAN in transit are confirmed as valid and neither revoked nor expired; the protocol permits only secure versions or configurations and cannot use or fall back to any insecure version, algorithm, key size or implementation; and encryption strength suits the encryption method chosen. Protection may be at the data level, the session level, or both. Applicability: a self-signed certificate can be acceptable when an internal CA of the organisation issued it, its author is confirmed, it is verified (for instance by hash or signature) and it has not expired. The bullet on confirming certificates are valid and neither revoked nor expired was advisory only up to 31 March 2025; the remaining bullets were already mandatory. Objective under the customized approach: nobody can read or capture cleartext PAN from traffic over open, public networks. Future-dated: treated as a best practice up to 31 March 2025 and mandatory since then.

Evidence an assessor expects: Data-flow diagram marking every point where PAN enters or leaves over open, public networks; TLS configuration exports or scan results showing allowed protocol versions and cipher suites, with no downgrade path; Certificate validation settings (CRL or OCSP checking, pinning) for servers and client integrations; Packet capture or transmission sample showing PAN is encrypted end to end; Test result showing a connection with an untrusted or expired certificate is refused
Where answers usually fall short: Legacy endpoint or API still negotiates an early TLS version or weak cipher when the client requests it; Integration client code disables certificate verification, accepting any certificate
Source: PCI DSS v4.0.1
HIPAA 164.312(e)(1) Transmission Security (Standard)

Implement technical security measures to guard against unauthorized access to ePHI transmitted over an electronic communications network. NIST recommends encrypted transport, secure email, and validated VPN.

Evidence an assessor expects: Transport encryption standard; TLS configuration scans; Secure email gateway records; VPN configuration evidence
Where answers usually fall short: Legacy TLS versions enabled; FTP and SMTP used in clear
Source: HIPAA Security Rule (45 CFR 164)

Other families in data protection and encryption